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Interest Checking
On January 1, 1986, all regulatory deposit rate
c:eililigsalidmiliihil..JmbalahcefeqlJil"ehients·
were removed from personal checking accounts
(although the prohibition against paying interest
on business checking accounts remains). This
completed a process of deposit rate deregulation
of personal checking accounts that began in ear-
nest with the nationwide authorization of NOW
(Negotiable Order of Withdrawal) accounts on
December 31, 1980 and Super NOW accounts
on January 5, 1983. The NOW account orig-
inally had a maximum deposit rate of 51 14 per-
cent (until January 1, 1986 when the ceiling was
removed), while the Super NOW deposit rate
was unrestricted. Today, there is no longer any
regulatory distinction betV\leen the two accounts.
Both the NOW and Super NOW accounts have
been extremely popular and have caused major
changes in the composition of consumer check-
ing accounts and in the narrowly defined M1
monetary aggregate. Most consumer checking
balances and a large part ofM1 now bear
interest.
In this Letter we analyze why these new
accounts so dramatically altered both deposi-
tors' and banks' portfolios, and examine the
sources ofthe funds deposited in them. In next
week's Letter, we assess the implications for the
behavior of the M1 monetary aggregate, which
includes balances in these accounts plus cur-
rency, travelers checks, and demand deposits.
Effects of the ceilings
The effects of lifting or removing interest rate
ceilings on checking accounts depend to a large
extent on how easy it was for depository institu-
tions to circumvent the ceilings through non-
price competition in the first place. Nonprice
competition is the practice of providing free or
underpriced services in lieu of explicit interest
payments.
Depository institutions expend resources on
attracting and holding various kinds of deposits
with the goal of equating the marginal costs of
different types of deposits, including transactions
deposits. However, when the payment of inter-
est was prohibited, depositors' returns generally
were less than banks' marginal costs of attracting
deposlt5beca.use nonpriced services are not per-
fect substitutes for cash interest payments. Since
depositors, in general, would have preferred the
cash equivalent of nonpriced services, they val-
ued nonpriced services at less than their cost.
Thus, by imposing the inefficiency of nonprice
competition, deposit rate ceilings drove a wedge
between depositories' marginal costs of deposits
and depositors' marginal returns.
The inherent inefficiency of nonprice competi-
tion implies that lifting or removing a deposit
rate ceiling would, in effect, increase depositors'
returns without affecting depositories' marginal
costs. Undoubtedly then, a major reason for the
popularity of interest-bearing checking accounts
is the interest they yield. Even at current low
interest rate levels, these interest-bearing check-
ing accounts will yield $10 to $11 billion in
interestthis year. Just a few years ago, checking
account balances would have earned no explicit
interest. Thus, although interest earnings are tax-
able, interest payments have provided a power-
ful incentive to shift zero-interest checking
balances and perhaps some savings balances as
well into the new interest-bearing accounts.
Strong evidence supporting the view that explicit
interest (even after taxes) on the new accounts
exceeded the implicit interest previously avail-
able on demand deposits is presented in Chart 1.
The chart indicates that a sharp drop in demand
deposits coincided with the dramatic increase in
NOW balances when they were first authorized
nationwide on December 31, 1980 (they had
been available previously on a limited basis)
and, similarly, that NOW deposits fell sharply
when Super NOWs were introduced.
These declines suggest that NOWs were suc-
cessful in attracting large quantities offunds pre-
viously held in demand deposits (which paid no
explicit interest), and that Super NOWs attracted
funds from NOWs (which paid limited interest).
These shifts would not have occurred if nonprice
competition had circumvented deposit rate ceil-
ings completely so that depositors valued the
nonpriced services fully. Thus, in the aggregate,
depositors' net returns on Super NOW accountsFRBSF
likely exceeded returns on NOWs, and the
returns on NOWs likely exceeded the returns on
demand deposits.
These shifts offunds from more regulated to less
regulated checking accounts are similar to shifts
thatoccurredfrom savings and time deposits .
with interest ceilings into the ceiling-free money
market deposit account (MMDA) when it was
authorized on December 14, 1982. Depositors
moved several hundred billion dollars from
lower-return regulated accounts into MMDAs.
Just as with transaction balances, there were
powerful incentives for depositors to move non-
transaction funds into higher-yielding savings
accounts.
As Chart 2 shows, the lifting of deposit rate ceil-
ings has dramatically raised the proportion of
personal checking account balances thatearn
explicit interest. At the beginning of 1977, less
than 5 percent ofthe funds in consumer check-
ing accounts were interest-bearing compared to
over 70 percent today. In only ten years, these
accounts have grown from $1 billion to over
$200 billion,
Tax effects
Not all personal demand deposits have shifted
into NOWs, nor have all NOW deposits shifted
into Super NOWs even though depositors might
be expected to prefer the highest yielding
account. The explanation for this lies largely in
our tax system, which creates incentives for
banks to provide a wide variety of checking
accounts with differentdeposit rates, minimum
balances, and service charges.
Checking accounts are somewhat unusual in
that banks simultaneously "borrow" deposits
and "sell" transaction services associated with
these deposits. The result ofthis arrangement is
a netpayment from either the bank to the
customer or vice versa, depending on whether
the yield on deposits exceeds the cost of transac-
tion services provided.
The tax system provides an incentive for banks
to reduce the deposit rates they pay on personal
transaction accounts by enough to cover the
cost of the transaction services they provide.
Currently/this incentive works through individ-
ual (but not business) depositors, who must pay
income taxes on explicit interest payments but
cannot deduct charges for transaction services.
These depositors can lower their taxes by select-
ing an account in which the banks' service
charges have been netted out of the interest
paid. For example, some depositors prefer
accounts that pay no interest and have no ser-
vice charges to accounts that pay taxable inter-
est and charge for services. A bank would be
willing to provide such a "free" account as long
as its profits on balances in the account equalled
or exceeded the costs of providing the associ-
ated transaction services.
The tax system also explains why zero-interest
checking accounts co-exist with higher yielding
checking accounts. Such accounts typically
have lower minimum balance requirements than
higher yielding checking accounts. Banks use
minimum balance requirements to ensure that
their net earnings on the deposits cover the cost
ofthe transaction services they provide.
For example, according to a 1985 survey by
Sheshunoff and Company, Super NOWs, which
paid the highest interest among personal check-
ing accounts, had an average minimum balance
requirement of $3,300 to avoid service charges.
This compared with a $1,073 requirement for
NOWs (which paid lower interest) and a $431
minimum balance requirement for demand
deposit accounts, which paid no interest.
Depositors who maintained only small balances
would have been better off with a zero-interest
demand deposit account even though a Super
NOW yielded more interest because the interest
it yielded would have been more than offset by
service charges, especially on an after-tax basis.
In contrast, depositors who maintained medium
or large balances would have been better off
with higher yielding NOW or Super NOW
accounts.
In sum, even though deregulation eliminated the
inefficiency of nonprice competition, the tax sys-
tem will continue to ensure that a wide variety
of checking accounts co-exist.
Sources of interest-bearing checkable deposits
The sources offunds placed in interest-bearing
checkable deposits may be an indicator of how
those balances will behave. For example, if
NOWs and Super NOWs attracted balances
from passbook savings accounts or maturing
time certificates, NOW and Super NOW bal-
ances might behave more like savings balances
than transaction balances. Both NOWs andChart 1
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Super NOWs are believed to have attracted a
significant amount of funds from savings and
maturing time certificates.
Surveys as well as our own statistical estimates
suggest that about one-quarter of the new
money that shifted into NOWs during the intro-
ductory NOW period came from nontransaction
sources. These funds. which probably came
from passbook savings and maturing time certifi-
cates. are likely to be more interest-sensitive
than demand deposits. Super NOWs probably
also attracted the same types of nontransaction
balances. However, because the MMDA was
introduced at about the same time and attracted
the same types offunds, it is difficult to measure
the magnitude of the transfers.
tion ofthese balances in interest-bearing
checking accounts. In contrast, as recently as
1977, virtually no checking balances paid
explicit interest. Moreover, since their nation-
wide introduction on December 31, 1980, inter-
est-bearing checking deposits have been by far
the most rapidly growing component of con-
sumer transaction balances.
This dramatic change is due to the inability of
nonprice competition to compensate most
depositors fully. The $10 billion or more that
consumers will earn this year apparently
exceeds (even on an after-tax basis) the free or
underpriced services that they would have
received if regulation continued to prohibit the
accounts from paying interest.
Another indication of shifts of nontransaction
balances into NOWs and Super NOWs is their
large average balances - approximately $5,000
in NOWs and $13,000 in Super NOWs. These
average balances are much closer to those of
traditional savings deposits than to those of per-
sonal noninterest checking accounts, which are
approximately $1,500.
Conclusion
Deposit rate deregulation has caused a major
change in the composition of consumer transac-
tion deposits by raising to70 percent the propor-
The shift in the composition of consumer check-
ing from noninterest-bearing to interest-bearing
has also had a significant impact on M1. Inter-
est-bearing transaction balances in M1, includ-
ing some formerly classified as savings, have
grown from virtually nothing before deregulation
to over 30 percent by mid-1986. In next week's
Letter, we present evidence that these effects of
deregulation have caused a. major change in the
relationship between M1 and the economy.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 202,622 - 120 6,388 3.2
Loans and Leases1 6 182,025 - 96 4,774 2.6
Commercial and Industrial 50,065 312 - 993 - 1.9
Real estate 67,030 171 1,659 2.5
Loans to Individuals 39,464 15 1,679 4.4
Leases 5,584 - 33 181 3.3
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 12,652 13 962 8.2
Other Securities2 7,945 - 37 651 8.9
Total Deposits 203,397 - 7,065 4,836 2.4
Demand Deposits 51,148 - 6,253 4,820 10.4
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 35,984 -15,986 - 6,677 -15.6
OtherTransaction Balances4 17,630 - 142 3,628 25.9
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 134,618 - 671 - 3,612 - 2.6
Money MarketDeposit
Accounts-Total 46,200 - 658 787 1.7
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 33,117 - 11 - 5,415 - 14.0
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 26,435 - 562 1781 7.2
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.s. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
5 Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change